Employment Cases   (updated 12/12/2000)

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Company, No. 99-15885 (9^th Cir. Nov. 20, 2000).  The three plaintiffs were laid off by Quaker Oats during a company wide reduction in force.  Plaintiffs sued, contending that they had been fired because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  The lower court awarded summary judgment to Quaker, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Quaker no longer employed people to do the jobs plaintiffs had done for many years.  Therefore, plaintiffs did not demonstrate a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA.  Plaintiffs had sought to amend their complaint after the close of discovery to allege the discriminatory impact theory of liability.  But after focusing on intentional discrimination during discovery, plaintiffs could not surprise the company at the summary judgment stage by pursuing a disparate impact theory of liability.

Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, No. 99-15374 (9^th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000).  Plaintiff alleged that because of his race, he suffered discrimination and retaliation, and endured a hostile work environment.  The lower court granted partial summary judgment to the employer for alleged events that occurred before the deadline for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  The pre-limitations period was closely enough related to the acts occurring during the limitations period to trigger the operation of a continuing violation theory on plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination. 

Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 99-12951 (11^th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000).  Plaintiff was the City's Affirmative Action Specialist.  One of her duties was to present a report on affirmative action at a department meeting.  The report included a dramatic personal commentary by plaintiff in which she stated the City was still plagued with racism.  Her superiors asked plaintiff to make various substantive changes before the report was delivered to the City Commission, but plaintiff refused.  Without approval, plaintiff distributed the report to all department heads.  She was then discharged.  Plaintiff sued, arguing that her First Amendment right to free speech had been violated.  The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and the 11^th Circuit affirmed.  Because plaintiff refused to alter the report in accordance with her superiors' instructions, any First Amendment interest she may have had in publishing her views was outweighed by the City's interest in producing an official document that conformed to the City's expectations.

Katz v. Regents of the University of California, No. 99-15384 (9^th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000).  Plaintiffs brought their age discrimination under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the comparable state statute.  They challenged the State's offer of a new early retirement incentive program to members of one retirement plan, whose average age was 55, and not to members of another retirement plan, whose average age was 60.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued for the first time that the case filed under ADEA against the State should be dismissed under the supreme Court's holding in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  Kimel held that on account of Eleventh Amendment immunity the states can not be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in ADEA suits.  Nothing in Kimel, however, prevented the State from waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity on a case-by-case basis, as the State had done here.

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, No. 98-15818 (9^th Cir. Oct. 23, 2000).  Plaintiff was a telephone dispatcher for the City.  On an evening shift, a co-worker approached her, placed his hand on her stomach, and then forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to fondle her bare breast.   Another dispatcher arrived before the co-worker could continue.  Plaintiff reported the incident and the co-worker was immediately placed on administrative leave pending an investigation. After the City determined he had violated the sexual harassment policy, the co-worker resigned.  Plaintiff sued the City for sexual harassment.  The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  To prevail on her hostile work environment claim, plaintiff had to show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of her employment and create an abusive working environment.   Here, plaintiff was harassed on a single occasion for a matter of minutes in a way that did not impair her ability to do her job in the long-term, especially given that the City took prompt steps to remove the co-worker from the workplace.

Cox v. City of Memphis, No. 99-5789 (6^th Cir. Oct. 18, 2000).  Plaintiffs were females holding the rank of lieutenant in the Memphis Police Department.  In 1995 the Police Department began an elective process for promotion to the rank of major.  Plaintiff took the necessary exams.  The first 18 candidates in rank order, including five of six black applicants, were promoted to major in 1996.  Two years later in 1998, the police department made its second and last round of promotions from the eligibility list.  Because none of the plaintiffs were selected, they filed charges with the EEOC in November 1998.  The EEOC dismissed the charges because they were filed more than 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.  When plaintiffs filed suit, it was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that there was a separate discriminatory act each time the Police Department promoted someone on the basis of the allegedly flawed eligibility list.  Noting a split in the circuits, the Sixth Circuit felt that promotion or hiring for an allegedly tainted promotions roster was not a "continuing act" but was merely the effect of previous discrimination.  The act of discrimination, and not any effect or consequence, triggered the time to file an EEOC charge.  The dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.         

O'Laughlin v. County of Orange, No. 9856774 (9^th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000).  Facing an issue of first impression, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer is liable for post-bankruptcy discharge conduct which violates the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Plaintiff was a nurse in a psychiatric emergency facility.  She suffered two attacks by patients, leaving here with nerve damage in her arm.  Her complaint alleged three separate episodes in which the County failed to accommodate her disability.  One failure to accommodate occurred before the County filed for bankruptcy, the second took place between filing for bankruptcy and discharge, and the third took place after discharge. The district court held that the second and third denials of accommodation were the inevitable consequence of the first denial, and were discharged.  Reversing, the Ninth Circuit felt that the county was liable for post-discharge conduct that violated the ADA.                                      

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., No. 96-16669 (9^th Cir. Oct. 4, 2000).  Plaintiff injured his back while working in a cargo position for U.S. Air.  He then transferred to the company's mail room.  Two employees with greater seniority planned to exercise their right to transfer to the mail room, which would have required plaintiff to transfer back to the cargo area.  Plaintiff requested that he be allowed to stay in the mail room as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Plaintiff filed suit but the district court granted U.S. Air's motion for summary judgment.  The Ninth Circuit held that the interactive process is a mandatory obligation on the party of the employers under the ADA and that the obligation was triggered by an employee giving notice of his disability and the desire for accommodation.  Employers who failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith faced liability if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.  Furthermore, the Court held that reassignment was a reasonable accommodation and that a seniority system was not a per se bar to reassignment.  However, a seniority system was a factor in the undue hardship analysis.  If the reassignment would not constitute an undue hardship to the employer, a disabled employee who seeks reassignment as a reasonable accommodation should receive the position rather than having an opportunity to compete with non-disabled employees.

Quinn v. City of Los Angeles, No. B128454 (Calif. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2000).  The plaintiff failed the medical exam given to applicants for police officers due to a significant hearing impairment.  Due to a clerical error, however, he was notified to report for further tests.  The plaintiff passed the additional tests, graduated from the Police Academy, and was assigned to patrol duty.  After another hearing exam revealed his hearing impairment, the Police Department terminated him while he was a probationary employee.  Plaintiff sued on the theory that his discharge constituted illegal disability discrimination in violation of state law.  The jury found in plaintiff's favor and awarded damages.  The appellate court reversed, finding there was no disability discrimination because plaintiff was never initially qualified for the position from which he was discharged.

Guz v. Bechtel, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2000).  After working for his employer for 22 years, having received major promotions, merit raises, and generally favorable job reviews, the 49 year old plaintiff was laid off during a reduction of the work force.  Plaintiff sued, arguing he was illegally fired, in part because of his age.  The trial court dismissed the suit, but it was reinstated by the Court of Appeals.  The California Supreme Court reversed, ruling that employers may lay off longtime employees who have performed well so long as the worker cannot show he had a Aspecific understanding@ of job security.  Although the length of employment and performance could still be considered, the test would include whether an employer's words, conduct, or written policies produced specific assurances.